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UNCONSCIONABLE: TAX DELINQUENCY SALES AS A FORM
OF DIGNITY TAKING
ANDREW W. KAHRL *
Oliver Wendell Holmes once called taxes “what we pay for civilized
society.” When it comes to local government and its chief source of
revenue—the property tax—African Americans have been forced to pay a
disproportionate share of that cost. Almost from the moment African
Americans ceased to be taxable property and began having their property
taxed, they became subject to discriminatory administrative practices and
the victim of structural inequities in its levying and enforcement, both of
which allowed local governments to subtly shift the tax burden onto the
backs of racial minorities, and in some states created opportunities for real
estate speculators and investors to prey on hard-pressed homeowners
through acquiring liens on tax-delinquent properties. Auctioned by local
governments at tax sales, tax lien certificates entitle its holders to collect
interest (which could run as high as twenty-four percent) and charge legal
fees on a tax debt and, if the property owner fails to settle within the
redemption period (which can range from six months to two years), acquire
deed to the property—all for the price of a single missed tax payment.
Despite efforts to abolish or drastically restrict the practice, predatory tax
buying continues to flourish in gentrifying urban real estate markets and
rural areas undergoing intensive land development, where sharp spikes in
property assessments lead to higher rates of tax delinquency and create
opportunities for investors to acquire valuable property at a bargain. Tax
liens also generate high returns on investment in depressed or depreciating
real estate markets, where investors can compel financially distressed
homeowners to meet exorbitant debt repayments by holding what is often
their most valuable possession—their home—ransom. Because minority
neighborhoods have historically been subject to discriminatory overtaxation 1 and lower property values as result of segregation and
* Assistant Professor of History, University of Virginia. The author can be reached at
awk6n@virginia.edu.
1. See Andrew W. Kahrl, The Power to Destroy: Discriminatory Property Assessments and the
Struggle for Tax Justice in Mississippi, 82 J. S. HIST. 579, 581–82 (2016).
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“redlining,” 2 African American homeowners have been and remain more
vulnerable to predatory tax buying.
Tax buying has inflicted a significant, if underappreciated, economic
toll on black America. It contributed, in no small measure, to the
precipitous decline of black landownership over the second half of the
twentieth century (from over 15 million acres in 1910 to 2.3 million acres
in 1997 3), prevented African American communities from becoming
partners in and beneficiaries of real estate development in some of
America’s most vibrant markets 4, accelerated the deterioration of urban
minority neighborhoods and stymied efforts at recovery 5, and exacerbated
the racial wealth gap. 6 It has also left deep emotional scars on victims,
robbing them of their dignity in the course of taking—or threatening to
take—their property.
Dignity taking was both a consequence and an agent of tax lien
profiteering, as well as a predictable result of the legal requirements for
property redemption. 7 From the moment they obtain a tax lien on another
person’s property, tax buyers work to maximize the return on their
investment by infantilizing their victims. First, they overwhelm victims
with a barrage of deliberately confusing documents, requirements, and
looming deadlines for compliance, in order to establish their superior
2. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); DAVID M. P. FREUND, COLORED
PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2007); BERYL
SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN
AMERICA (2009).
3. Miessha Thomas et al., What Is African-American Land Ownership?, FED’N OF S. COOPS./
ASSISTANCE
FUND,
http://www.federationsoutherncoop.com/aalandown04.htm
LAND
[https://perma.cc/RL74-4WAA] (last updated 2004); see also ROBERT S. BROWNE, BLACK ECON.
RESEARCH CTR., ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES: THE DECLINE OF BLACK-OWNED LAND IN THE RURAL
SOUTH (1973); Roy W. Copeland, The Rise and Fall of Black Real Property Ownership: A Review of
Black Land Ownership from the Rough Beginnings to the Great Gains; Dispossession via the Use of
‘Legal’ Tactics and the Push for Black Land Retention, 9 BLACK L.J. 51, 52–53 (1984).
4. See Andrew Kahrl, Sunbelt by the Sea: Race and Nature in a Twentieth-Century Coastal
Metropolis, 38 J. URB. HIST. 488 (2012).
5. Andrew W. Kahrl, Capitalizing on the Urban Fiscal Crisis: Predatory Tax Buyers in 1970s
Chicago, J. URB. HIST. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 1 (2015).
6. According to a 2015 study by the policy think tank Demos, the median white household has
nearly sixteen times more wealth than the median black household in America. See LAURA SULLIVAN
(2015),
ET AL., DEMOS, THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP: WHY POLICY MATTERS 7
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/RacialWealthGap_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CRDS5J5].
7. See Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New
Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796, 820 (2016); BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING
FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014); Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a
Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016).
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knowledge of the law and convince the delinquent taxpayer that the fate of
their homes rests solely in the tax buyer’s hands. They never fail to remind
tax delinquent homeowners of their own carelessness and irresponsibility—
and their status as a tax scofflaw—in order to create the impression that
they should not expect to gain sympathy from others. That the debt in
question is to government—seemingly unforgiving, and with the full
weight of the law on its side—only reinforces this sense of helplessness.
Psychologically traumatized and infantilized, the delinquent taxpayer
becomes less likely to question the lien holder’s authority, inquire about
their legal rights, or seek outside assistance or legal counsel. Tax buyers do
not merely benefit from delinquent taxpayers’ humiliation and shame (over
their failure to pay their taxes on time, and the personal or financial
circumstances that led to it) and fear (of losing one’s property), they seek to
actively cultivate it so as to entrap victims in crippling debt repayment
plans, keep them unaware of their legal rights, and keep themselves and
their business practices shielded from public scrutiny. The current remedies
for protecting homeowners from predatory tax buyers not only fail to
restore the dignity of its victims; it instead imposes an additional, even
more pernicious, form of dignity taking. That’s because the laws regarding
tax delinquency virtually necessitate victims to convince the courts of their
own incompetency and inability to handle their own financial affairs in
order to void a tax deed and save their home. In short, victims of predatory
tax buyers must willingly sacrifice their own dignity in order to
successfully recover their property.
The tax lien industry and the local government bodies that sanction—
indeed, administer and enforce—these investment strategies routinely
engage in what Bernadette Atuahene defines as a “dignity taking.” As this
essay shows, a process of infantilization structures not only the relationship
between delinquent taxpayers and tax lien investors, but also between
delinquent taxpayers and the courts. These actions have far reaching
consequences, for individual victims and their families as well as entire
communities. As such, Atuahene’s concept of “dignity restoration”—which
involves “compensation that addresses both the economic harms and the
dignity deprivations involved” in the process of taking one’s property and
aims to “rehabilitate [victims] and reintegrate them into the fabric of
society”—offers a more appropriate remedy for addressing the harms
caused by predatory tax buying than mere reparations, which fail to
account for victims’ experience of (threatened) dispossession.
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***
If you don’t pay your property taxes, the state can take your property.
This simple rule applies to all real property in the United States. But while
all states have laws that permit local governments to place liens on
properties whose owners failed to pay their taxes, and allow for the
eventual foreclosure on tax-delinquent properties, the manner in which
local governments handle tax liens once a property falls into delinquency
varies wildly. 8 Some states allow local governments to auction the deeds to
tax delinquent properties, with the remaining proceeds (after the tax debt
and costs of the sale are satisfied) paid to the former owner. 9 Other states
require local governments to take eventual ownership of tax delinquent
properties. 10 But in the majority of states, local governments are not only
permitted to initiate foreclosure of tax delinquent properties, they are also
authorized to sell liens on tax delinquent properties to private investors. At
these tax sales, bidders compete to pay someone else’s tax debt 11; in return,
they are entitled to charge interest on that debt at rates ranging from
eighteen percent to as high as fifty percent and, in some states, add a host
of other charges and fees to the delinquent taxpayer’s final bill. The
delinquent taxpayer must settle their debts within a predetermined period of
time (known as the redemption period, which can range from six months to
two years), or risk losing the property and all of its equity to the tax lien
certificate holder (or “tax buyer”). 12 Most “tax buyers” treat tax lien
8. For laws on tax delinquency by state, see JOHN RAO, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE
OTHER FORECLOSURE CRISIS: PROPERTY TAX LIENS SALES 43–46 (2012).
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Bidding procedures for tax lien certificate sales also vary by state. The two most common
methods are the interest rate method (in which bidding starts at the maximum allowable interest rate
and competitors bid down) and the overbid method (in which bidding starts at the amount of delinquent
taxes plus costs and goes up). See id. at 14–15. Both methods are highly susceptible to collusion among
bidders and corruption among officials. As early as the 1940s, investigations of the tax buying industry
found collusive practices to be so pervasive as to be almost customary, implicitly condoned by
treasurer’s offices that were primarily concerned with maximizing the number of properties sold (and
revenue brought in), not the interest penalties applied to delinquent taxpayers. See W. H. SPECK, TAX
SALES AND TAX TITLES IN ILLINOIS 25–26 (1948). From the mid-1960s through the mid-1990s, roughly
ninety-five percent of the tax lien certificates sold at Cook County, Illinois’s annual tax sale went to
bidders who demanded the maximum eighteen percent interest rate. See Supreme Court Says Treasurer
May Take Steps ‘Reasonably Necessary’ to Promote Competition, COOK CTY. TREASURER’S OFFICE
(Dec.
5,
2000),
http://www.cookcountytreasurer.com/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=195
[https://perma.cc/2E9A-LCMT]. In recent years, the Justice Department has taken steps to curb tax
buyer collusion, successfully prosecuting tax buyers for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act in
Illinois in 2001, Maryland in 2011, and New Jersey in 2013. See Joe Tyrrell, FBI Probe Snares Another
SPOTLIGHT
(Jan.
10,
2013),
Firm
for
Rigging
Tax-Lien
Auctions,
NJ
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/01/09/fbi-probe-snares-another-firm-for-rigging-tax-lienauctions [https://perma.cc/WPB7-TNHX].
12. RAO, supra note 8, at 17.
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certificates as a form of investment, and use the threat of foreclosure to
compel payments. Some tax buyers, however, treat tax lien sales as an
opportunity to acquire real estate at a steep discount, often the price of a
single unpaid tax bill.
As an instrument of local government, tax sales ostensibly serve two
purposes under the law. They aim to ensure taxpayer compliance and deter
property owners from shirking their tax obligations by threatening them
with onerous interest payments and assorted fines and fees on their tax
debts and, should they fail to settle within a predetermined period of time,
the loss of their property. They also provide local governments with a
source of revenue by allowing them to market unpaid tax bills (or, tax
receivables) to third parties, in exchange for the right to accrue interest on
that debt or acquire title to the property itself. The threat of tax foreclosure
is the leverage these tax buyers use to compel payments, often from
desperate, financially distressed homeowners.
The sale of tax liens to third parties first emerged as a mechanism of
revenue collection in rural counties on the nineteenth-century Western
frontier. 13 From its inception, tax lien sales provided savvy investors
steady, potentially lucrative, returns, and afforded ample opportunities for
manipulation and abuse. This was due to the opaque, inscrutable manner in
which sales were conducted (which, almost by design, worked to
discourage amateur investors and allow small, tight-knit groups of bidders
to dominate local auctions) 14 and, relatedly, local government’s
administrative autonomy over tax assessment and collection procedures. As
states began to adopt new methods of taxation—including, sales,
inheritance, corporation, and income taxes—in the early twentieth century,
they came to rely less on the property tax, 15 which became strictly a county
or municipal tax in support of local services, especially public schools. 16
Simultaneously, the property tax itself became, in fact if not in name, a tax
on real estate, as collectors steadily abandoned onerous and often futile
attempts to locate and assess personal property, which could be easily

13. See generally Robert P. Swierenga, The Tax Buyer as a Frontier Investor Type, 7
EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 257 (1970).
14. See RAO, supra note 8, at 5.
15. See W. Elliott Brownlee, The Transformation of the Tax System and the Experts, 1870–1930,
32 NAT’L TAX J. 47, 49 (1979); HENRY J. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX? A NEW VIEW 8
(1975).
16. By the 1920s, U.S. cities with populations over 30,000 generated over ninety percent of its
revenue from property taxes. See DAVID T. BEITO, TAXPAYERS IN REVOLT: TAX RESISTANCE DURING
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1–2 (1989).
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concealed, in favor of that one asset no owner could hope to hide: buildings
and land. 17
The local nature of the property tax’s allocation was reflected in the
regulation of its collection. While state tax commissions often established
general guidelines for the collection and recording of tax assessments and
payments, and state legislatures authored the provisions for enforcing
payment and handling delinquency, counties and municipalities exercised a
great deal of discretion in determining the assessed value of real property. 18
Conversely, taxpayers had few legal options for contesting a property tax
bill. 19 This, in turn, allowed local tax assessors to engage in discriminatory
practices with virtual impunity. Not surprisingly, the beneficiaries of
artificially low assessments tended to possess political and economic
influence, while victims of discriminatory over-assessment tended to be
poorer, politically marginalized classes of taxpayers, and disproportionately
racial and ethnic minorities. 20
As local control and administrative autonomy became hallmarks of
property tax assessment and enforcement in America, the property tax
emerged as a potent instrument of white supremacy. From the late
nineteenth through the early twentieth century, African American
landholdings in the South grew dramatically, and in inverse proportion to
their civil rights. 21 This was no coincidence. In pursuing property
ownership, African Americans were not simply seeking shelter from Jim
Crow; they were also claiming property rights. Stripped of their civil rights,
cheated out of their wages, and subject to the constant threat of violence at
the hands of the state or the mob, black Southerners found in
landownership a measure of independence and a modicum of legal standing
under the law. In the segregated South, owning property and paying
property taxes gave, the historian N. D. B. Connolly argues, “the otherwise
disempowered or disenfranchised certain political entitlements.” 22 To the
generation of black Southerners who came of age under Jim Crow, the right
17. Id. at 3–4.
18. See generally HARLEY LEIST LUTZ, THE STATE TAX COMMISSION: A STUDY OF THE
DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTS OF STATE CONTROL OVER THE ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY FOR
TAXATION (1918); John Shannon, Conflict Between State Assessment Law and Local Assessment
Practice, in PROPERTY TAXATION USA 39 (Richard W. Lindholm ed., 1967).
19. See Robert F. Williams, The Tax Injunction Act and Judicial Restraint: Property Tax
Litigation in Federal Courts, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 653, 655 (1981). See generally Daan Braveman, Fair
Assessment and Federal Jurisdiction in Civil Rights Cases, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 351 (1984).
20. See Kahrl, supra note 1, at 592–93.
21. See generally LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERS IN THE SOUTH 1790–1915
(1990).
22. N. D. B. CONNOLLY, A WORLD MORE CONCRETE: REAL ESTATE AND THE REMAKING OF JIM
CROW SOUTH FLORIDA 281 (2014).
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to property and the rights of property owners seemed to carry greater
weight, and provide its holders greater standing under the law, than abstract
appeals for civil rights. Black property owners referred to their status as
taxpayers as proof of their right to public spaces and amenities. 23 Indeed, it
was not uncommon to find African Americans displaying their property tax
receipts when making claims on the state. 24
But the rights that property ownership seemed to confer on black
Americans were more illusory than real, subject at every moment to the
judicial and bureaucratic machinations of a white supremacist state. And
ironically, it was the very responsibility of property ownership that blacks
used to make those claims on the state—payment of property taxes—that
exposed them to new forms of discrimination and left them vulnerable to
property loss. In the rural South, tax assessors routinely over- and
undervalued farmland according to the race of its owner, disproportionately
overburdening black property owners. 25 In addition to being forced to pay
more than their white counterparts for far less of the public services their
tax dollars paid to support, African American property owners were subject
to a Jim Crow bureaucracy vested with the power to take the property of
delinquent taxpayers, and with a variety of mechanisms for forcing
otherwise compliant taxpayers into delinquency. Local tax collectors could
simply fail to mail tax bills to targeted property owners 26, fail to record
payments 27, or fail to notify persons that a lien had been placed on their
property and had been auctioned to a third party. 28 These were among the
charges leveled by black property owners who unwittingly fell into tax
delinquency.
The tax lien and tax sale performed a variety of functions for the Jim
Crow state. It could be used it to intimidate and punish the outspoken or
recalcitrant. Persons such as Amy Mallard, who, following the lynching of
her husband, Robert Mallard, a prosperous African American landowner
and businessman in Toombs County, Georgia, in November 1948,
23. Id.
24. Id. at 208.
25. See Kahrl, supra note 1, at 585.
26. Staples Can’t Rule on Jim Crow Tax List, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, May 12, 1934, at 9; P.
Bernard Young Jr., Slums and Taxes, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, Feb. 22, 1936, at 8; Jaunita Greene, She
Didn’t Pay Her Tax Bill in 1947: So She’s About to Lose Her Property, DAYTONA BEACH MORNING J.,
Sept. 15, 1950.
27. P. Bernard Young, The Melting Pot, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, Feb. 22, 1932, at 8.
28. See Joseph Brooks, Emergency Land Fund: A Rural Land Retention and Development Model,
in THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER—ENDANGERED SPECIES: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 77, 84–85 (Leo McGee & Robert Boone eds., 1979); Carl H. Marbury, The Decline in
Black-Owned Rural Land: Challenge to the Historically Black Institutions of Higher Education, in THE
BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER—ENDANGERED SPECIES, supra, at 65, 66.
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embarked on a nationwide speaking tour for the NAACP, where she
publicly named the persons who had abducted and shot her husband.29
While in exile, Toombs County officials placed a lien on her family’s farm,
claiming nonpayment of property taxes for the previous three years, and
announced plans to sell it at a tax auction. 30 Mallard produced tax receipts
for the years in question, which attorneys for the NAACP delivered to
county officials, halting its sale. 31 A white mob subsequently descended on
the Mallard farm, looted the home, stole the livestock, and burned the
house and barn to the ground. 32
Along with declaring black-owned property tax delinquent and
subjecting it to a tax sale, white tax officials also grossly over-assessed the
value of individual black-owned parcels or, in some cases, all black-owned
land in a town or county, in retaliation for protests or political activism. In
the fall of 1966, the African American residents of Edwards, Mississippi,
launched a boycott of white-owned businesses in response to a litany of
injustices, including the lack of sewer lines, paved sidewalks, and street
lights in black neighborhoods; town officials’ failure to respond to
complaints of toxic fumes emitted from a chemical plant located on the
black side of town; and the town’s decision to sell its swimming pool to a
private, whites-only club immediately following court-ordered
desegregation. The boycott lasted several months and inflicted considerable
damage on local merchants’ and town finances. The following year, white
officials sharply raised the assessed value of nearly every black-owned
property in the town, while maintaining or reducing the assessed value of
white-owned property. Despite an abundance of evidence of intentional
discrimination, the federal district court dismissed a class-action lawsuit
against town officials, on the grounds that the 1937 Tax Injunction Act
prevented the federal courts from interfering with local assessment
practices. 33
More often, whites in the South manipulated tax assessments or forced
people into tax delinquency in order to steal their land. In a letter to the
New Republic in 1940, NAACP Special Counsel and future U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall alerted readers to what he described as “a

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
606.

Georgia Lynch Victim’s Wife May Move to Coast, CHI. DEFENDER, Feb. 12, 1949, at 1.
Mrs. Mallard Notified Property Up for Sale, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Feb. 2, 1949, at 1.
Georgia Lynch Victim’s Wife May Move to Coast, supra note 29.
Kluxers Burn Mallard Home, CHI. DEFENDER, Oct. 22, 1949, at 1.
See Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21, 23–24 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Kahrl, supra note 1, at
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practice and custom in the South of depriving Negroes of their property
through subterfuge,” and noted that:
In many communities of the South, Negroes own property which
becomes enhanced in value by either a real-estate development or
expansion of business areas.
In many cases Negro property owners refuse to sell their property for
low prices and in other cases they are not requested to sell.
But through cooperation with local tax officials, the Negroes owning the
property are not sent tax bills on their property. The owners, most of
whom are unfamiliar with legal procedure, believe they have to get a tax
bill before they can be held liable for taxes.
When they do not receive those tax bills they do not pay their taxes.
Others inquire about the tax bills and are either not given any
information or are put off with the statement that “everything is all
right.”
When the taxes are past due and are in arrears for the statutory period,
the property is quietly sold at a tax sale without notice to the owners. The
Negroes are not notified until after the statutory period of redemption has
passed. They are then forced to leave the property. 34

Indeed, whenever black-owned land in the rural South suddenly
became desirable, bureaucratic malfeasance soon followed. Shortly after
the African American siblings James, William, and Elisha Warfield
discovered oil and installed seven wells on their 160-acre farm in Adams
County, Mississippi, in 1951, local officials uncovered missing tax
payments and promptly sold a lien on the entire tract to speculator H. M.
Marks. 35 Worth an estimated $10 million, Marks paid $8 per acre for the
Warfield’s property, which he subsequently resold to the Sohio Petroleum
Co. for an undisclosed sum. 36 This was a common experience for African
Americans with the dubious fortune of owning land that white people
wanted. “Time after time,” a reporter who interviewed blacks living in
Mississippi in 1966, remarked, “Negroes told how their land had been
taken over by white farmers by manipulation of tax sales or foreclosures.” 37
As investigators for organizations such as the Emergency Land Fund
found, local officials often played an active role in facilitating the
expropriation of black-owned land via tax sales. 38
34. Thurgood Marshall, Cold, Cold Ground, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 12, 1940, at 216.
35. Brothers Claim Huge Oil Fraud, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Oct. 20, 1951, at 8.
36. Id.
37. William A. Price, After Greenville: The Poor People of Mississippi, NAT’L GUARDIAN, Mar.
5, 1966, at 3.
38. William E. Nelson Jr., Black Equity Base and Political Power, in BLACK RURAL
LANDOWNER—ENDANGERED SPECIES, supra note 28, at 41, 54.
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Nowhere was this more evident than in the rapidly appreciating real
estate markets of the 1960s and 1970s coastal South. In the years after the
completion of the Sea Pines Plantation on Hilton Head Island, South
Carolina, in 1956, land values along the South Carolina and Georgia Sea
Islands skyrocketed, as developers moved to replicate the resort’s success
and land speculators looked to capitalize on the demand for coastal
property. 39 In South Carolina and across the coastal South, African
Americans owned a significant amount of land in areas being targeted for
development. For many of these families, their ownership claims dated
back to the dawn of emancipation. 40 Land speculators ruthlessly exploited
tax delinquency laws to defraud and dispossess poor, often elderly African
Americans of their property holdings. In one instance, a white speculator
befriended Evelina Jenkins, an African American woman who owned an
entire island on the South Carolina coast, and convinced her to allow him
to handle her financial affairs, including her property taxes. But instead of
delivering Jenkins’s property tax payments to the county treasurer’s office,
he purposely allowed her property to fall into tax delinquency, whereupon
he successfully acquired the lien at the county’s tax auction. Following the
close of the redemption period, he obtained the deed and had Jenkins
evicted. He subsequently sold the land to a developer. 41 Today, dozens of
vacation homes, each worth upwards of $500,000 42, fill the island Jenkins
formerly owned. Jenkins, meanwhile, was forced to move into a trailer
home with one of her daughters, where she died penniless at the age of
ninety in 1997. 43 Investigators for the Emergency Land Fund reported other
“[c]ases . . . of blacks having leased their land to whites with the
understanding that the tenant would pay the taxes, whereas the tenant
39. See generally AM. SOC’Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, SUBDIVIDING RURAL AMERICA: IMPACTS
OF RECREATIONAL LOT AND SECOND HOME DEVELOPMENT (1976); JUNE MANNING THOMAS, BLACKS
ON THE SOUTH CAROLINA SEA ISLANDS: PLANNING FOR TOURIST AND LAND DEVELOPMENT (1977);

June Manning Thomas, Effects of Land Development on Black Land Ownership in the Sea Islands of
South Carolina, 8 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 266 (1978); June Manning Thomas, The Impact of
Corporate Tourism on Gullah Blacks: Notes on Issues of Employment, 41 PHYLON 1 (1980); MICHAEL
N. DANIELSON, PROFITS AND POLITICS IN PARADISE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HILTON HEAD ISLAND
(1995).
40. See generally WILLIE LEE ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION: THE PORT ROYAL
EXPERIMENT (1964).
41. Roy Reed, Blacks in South Struggle to Keep the Little Land They Have Left, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
7, 1972, at 39; see also Marbury, supra note 28, at 99.
42. Real estate values on Horse Island, SC, found using trulia.com and author’s observations of
“for sale” signs. See TRULIA, https://www.trulia.com/SC/Horse_Island [https://perma.cc/3WYT7NYU].
43. Evelina Jenkins, Obituary, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Dec. 5, 1997),
http://savannahnow.com/stories/120597/NWSobits120597.html#.V-aUsjKZNPM
[https://perma.cc/F5LJ-MMMR].
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deliberately failed to pay the taxes, concealed the tax notices, and
ultimately purchased the property cheaply when it went up for auction.” 44
Along with the property, predatory tax buyers also took their victims’
dignity. After the initial shock of losing their land to tax foreclosure,
feelings of shame soon followed. One scholar who documented black land
loss on the South Carolina Sea Islands in the 1970s found that the number
of cases of fraudulent land loss via tax sales far exceeded the number of
reported complaints, a phenomenon she attributed, in part, to victims’
embarrassment at their predicament. 45 Given the importance of property
ownership in the southern black political imagination—the ways in which
owning land became synonymous with citizenship, how it conferred on its
holders a certain status and recognition within their communities—and the
pride black property owners had placed in paying their taxes, falling into
tax delinquency could be a deeply humiliating experience and one that
persons were often inclined to suffer in silence.
Fear, humiliation, and social isolation greased the wheels of tax
buying operations. It diminished the chances of a tax delinquent property
owner seeking legal counsel, inquiring of their legal rights, or contesting a
tax deed in court, where they might stand before a judge highly
sympathetic to their plight, contemptuous of the tax buying profession, and
eager to find any legal rationale for voiding a deed. 46 Ashamed and
embarrassed, the delinquent taxpayer was more likely to deal exclusively
with the tax buyer and accept his terms and conditions without complaint,
and less likely to reach out to those in a position to provide critical legal or
financial assistance. Tax buyers, in turn, played an active role in stripping
tax delinquent property owners of their dignity and convincing them of the
futility of challenging them in court. “Delinquent taxpayers,” a circuit court
judge in Wayne County, Michigan, commented in 1971, “often are not
sophisticated about the law. They often don’t know their rights. So the tax
buyer goes to see them and says: ‘Look, I don’t want to take you to court,’
then offers to forget the whole thing for a few hundred dollars. Quite often
the taxpayer—afraid of losing his home—pays up. This results in
tremendous windfalls for the tax buyer.” 47
44. Yvonne Shinhoster, Growing Loss of Land Plagues Southern Rural Blacks, ATLANTA DAILY
WORLD, Aug. 28, 1975, at 1.
45. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 152.
46. Writing on tax sales in Wayne County, Michigan, one reporter noted that many judges were
“aware of the injustice of the law, [and] go out of their way not to enforce it.” Tax Sales: Legal
Extortion, PROP. TAX NEWSL., June 1971, at 5–6.
47. See generally Peter Benjamin, How to Lose Your Home for $18: The Law and the Tax Buyers,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 16, 1971.
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Whether they operated in the booming real estate markets of the
sunbelt South or in the distressed markets of deindustrializing northern
cities, and whether they sought to saddle a distressed homeowner with
onerous debt or take their property, tax buyers engaged in strategic forms
of “dignity taking.” Indeed, as the following profiles of individual tax
buyers reveals, infantalization did not merely accompany property loss; it
often helped to initiate and facilitate that loss.
***
“[O]nly the ‘dumb and dim-witted’ lose their property [to tax
foreclosure]”
—Chicago attorney Robert Cushman testifying before Illinois General
Assembly (1969) 48

During the 1970s, John Barrow was a familiar face at tax sale auctions
across the state of Florida. After having taught himself how to invest in tax
liens by studying state statutes, Barrow traveled to county courthouses
throughout the state to bid at auctions and to remote areas to personally
inspect tax delinquent properties. 49 As he built capital and increased his
volume of tax lien holdings, Barrow began to exhibit some of the character
traits found among successful tax buyers. He was both braggadocious—he
once claimed to a reporter to be “Florida’s foremost authority on tax
deeds” 50—and inscrutable. “I know him, but I don’t know him,” a fellow
Callahan resident said of Barrow. 51
Barrow practiced a particularly vicious, but perfectly legal, form of
tax lien investing. He purchased liens on owner-occupied properties whose
owners, he speculated, were less likely to be able to redeem (or understand
the consequences of nonpayment), whereupon he would acquire the deed
and then attempt to sell the house back to its former owners. 52 Fedo and
Hattie Mae Kenon, an elderly African American couple in Gadsden
County, Florida, were among the persons Barrow attempted to extort in this
manner. The Kenons had bought their modest, three-bedroom house with

42.

48. Bill to End Tax-Delinquency Abuses OKd by House Unit, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 8, 1969, at

49. See generally Realtors Aiding Family Who Lost Home to ‘Wheeler-Dealer,’ LAKELAND
LEDGER (Fla.), Sept. 14, 1979.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Couple Owing Tax Get Offers, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Sept. 12, 1979.*
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the money they had earned from years of labor in tobacco fields. 53 The
husband Fedo suffered from mental illness and periodically checked
himself into the state mental hospital. 54 In 1975, he neglected to pay a
$3.05 special assessment tax to the county. 55 When the county notified the
Kenons by mail of the outstanding tax payment, an embarrassed Fedo hid
the letter from his wife. 56 The following year, Barrow successfully
purchased a tax lien certificate on the Kenons home at the county’s tax
auction and then waited to see if the Kenons would redeem. 57 When they
failed to redeem before the deadline, Barrow paid $102 for the tax deed to
the Kenons’ home. 58
In a strict legal sense, Barrow’s petition for a tax deed was airtight.
Tax buyers like Barrow knew from experience that most judges found the
practice of predatory tax buying abhorrent, and would void a tax deed for
the slightest failure to follow procedures. As a result, successful tax buyers
meticulously adhered to every legal requirement. Unable to find fault in the
petition, the court granted Barrow a deed to the Kenons’ home. 59
On July 11, 1979, Barrow visited his new property and introduced
himself to its former owners. “You know you done lost everything but your
furniture and clothes, even the stove and ice box?” he brusquely informed
the bewildered couple. 60 Infantilizing the Kenons, Barrow made it clear
that he now controlled their fate. “He gave me his card and said he’d be
back in August and if I cooperated and did like he said, he wouldn’t put me
out,” Hattie Mae recalled. 61 “If I didn’t, he said, ‘I’ll have the law put you
out.’” 62 The price for cooperating: $10,000. 63
After Barrow left, Hattie Mae said she “cried some, and I prayed
some.” 64 She then reached out to North Florida Legal Services for
53. See generally Friends Rally to Help Couple Facing Loss of Florida House, BULLETIN, Sept.
12, 1979.*
54. See generally Their Home Lost: For $3.05 in Taxes, ELLENSBURG DAILY REC. (Wash.), Sept.
11, 1979.*
55. Id.
56. See generally Find Way to Avoid Another Kenon Case, OCALA STAR-BANNER (Fla.), Sept.
14, 1979.*
57. See generally Court Urged to Apply Reform Law, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J., Nov. 26,
1980.*
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Couple Owing Tax Get Offers, supra note 52.*
61. Id.*
62. Id.*
63. Id.*
64. See generally Couple, 7 Children May Lose Home over $3 Tax, OBSERVER-REP., Sept. 12,
1979.*
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assistance. 65 The Kenons’ attorneys alerted the press and within weeks the
case began to attract national attention. A fundraising campaign to assist
the Kenons in buying back their home generated over $12,000 in
donations. 66 Rallies and benefits for the Kenons were held across the state
of Florida. 67 Reporters uncovered numerous examples of other families
who had fallen delinquent on their homes (oftentimes, like the Kenons, by
accident) and into the clutches of Barrow. 68
Despite being subject to withering attacks from the press and the
recipient of numerous death threats and thousands of hate letters, Barrow
remained defiant. “Fellows like me protect the American people,” he told
one reporter. 69 “The man who buys a tax deed is the backbone of this
country.” 70 Tax buying, he added, was like any other capitalist enterprise.
“Everybody in this world, if they profit any, profit to the disadvantage of
other folks and that’s the way the world is built.” 71
As the Kenons’ attorney built a case for voiding the tax deed, the state
comptroller, bowing the public pressure, announced plans to hold
disciplinary hearings with the goal of revoking his mortgage broker’s
license. 72 Barrow, meanwhile, continued to acquire tax deeds and force
families into exploitative buy-back arrangements. In November 1979,
Barrow sought to obtain the deed to a home owned by a single mother with
four children who had failed to pay a $552 property tax bill. Putnam
County circuit court judge Charles Hood refused to issue the deed, telling
Barrow, “In this situation, my moral obligations override my legal
obligations.” 73
The attorneys for the Kenons similarly appealed to Circuit Court
Judge Ben Willis’s conscience. “The court,” Kenons’ attorney George
Clark argued, “should rule that . . . the inadequacy of price . . . is shocking
to the conscience of the judiciary[,]” 74 and therefore exercise its general
65. See generally Their Home Lost: For $3.05 in Taxes, supra note 54.*
66. See generally Couple Who Lost Home Get Contributions, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Jan. 2,
1980.*
67. See generally Support Grows for Quincy Family, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 14, 1979.*
68. See generally Realtors Aiding Family Who Lost Home to ‘Wheeler-Dealer,’ supra note 49;
see also Couple Owing Tax Get Offers, supra note 52.*
69. See generally John Barrow Plans to Quit and Watch Taxpayers Suffer, OCALA LAKELAND
LEDGER, Feb. 3, 1980.*
70. Id.*
71. See generally Their Home Lost: For $3.05 in Taxes, supra note 54.*
72. See generally Investor Says Tax Deed Buy Turned Him into a Victim, OCALA STAR-BANNER,
Oct. 25, 1979.*
73. See generally Barrow Is Foiled in Tax Deed Buy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 2, 1979.*
74. Couple Who Lost Home for $3.05 Asks Judge to Return Property, ST. PETERSBURG EVENING
INDEP., Mar. 20, 1980, at 3A.*
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equitable power to void the deed. In effect, it tried to awaken the
conscience of the judge, conceding that, while legal in a technical sense,
the awarding of the deed in this case was so unfair it required extraordinary
judicial intervention. In this case, it worked. Citing the common law
doctrine of equity, Judge Ben Willis voided Barrow’s tax deed and ordered
the Kenons to repay Barrow $102 plus twelve percent interest. “To set
aside and rescind the tax deed,” Willis wrote in his opinion, “will result
only in the loss by Barrow of his bargain, which is an enrichment (that) a
court of conscience may not sanction.” 75 A court of appeals affirmed the
ruling without comment. 76
The equity doctrine, when combined with intensive media exposure
and public outrage, provided one of the few viable strategies for preventing
the loss of property after the issuance of a tax deed. But its effectiveness
was highly uncertain and applicable to only the most egregious cases and
most sympathetic judges. Moreover, it required its victims to beg for mercy
and present themselves before the public as impoverished, ignorant, and
worthy of pity. Articles on the Kenons focused on Fedo’s mental illness
and illiteracy, the couple’s lack of education, and the house’s
“ramshackle,” dilapidated state. 77 It virtually necessitated victims to subject
themselves to public humiliation. Rather than dignity restoration, this “hail
Mary” strategy for property recovery required its victims to suffer another
form of dignity taking.
Despite the flurry of media coverage, the Kenon case only resulted in
modest reforms to Florida’s tax delinquency sale laws. Passed by the
Florida state legislature and signed into law soon after the case came to
light, the “Kenon bill” (as it was dubbed) forbade the sale of tax certificates
on homestead properties for tax delinquencies under $100 and mandated
that notices to delinquent taxpayers provide clear warning in “plain

75. Sam Miller, Couple Gets Back Home Lost for a Pittance, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Dec. 5, 1980),
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1980/12/05/Couple-gets-back-home-lost-for-a-pittance/6252344840400
[https://perma.cc/ED3N-TKUM]. Thanks to Thomas Joo for bringing this article to my attention and for
explaining the equity doctrine and its application in this case to me.
76. Just and Merciful, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Apr. 5, 1980;* see also Hurrah! Couple Wins
Home Back in Rip-Off Case, BALT. AFRO-AM., Apr. 12, 1980, at 3*; Court Returns to Couple Home
Lost in Tax Sale, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Dec. 6, 1980*; Couple Regains Home, READING EAGLE,
Dec. 7, 1980*; Tax Deed Speculator Misses Deadline to Appeal Ruling Against Purchase, DAYTONA
BEACH MORNING J., Jan. 8, 1981.*
77. See Their Home Lost: For $3.05 in Taxes, supra note 54;* see also Couple, 7 Children May
Lose Home over $3 Tax, supra note 64;* Couple Owing Tax Get Offers, supra note 52;* Find Way to
Avoid Another Kenon Case, supra note 56;* Kenons Plan to Repair House Nearly Lost in Tax
Controversy, UNITED OCALA STAR-BANNER, Dec. 19, 1980, at 2A.*
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English” of the consequences of nonpayment. 78 Lawmakers later amended
the bill to include a requirement that bids on tax delinquent properties be no
less than fifty percent of the property’s assessed value. 79 It prevented the
most outrageous injustices resulting from predatory tax buying, but left the
key components of tax lien investing firmly intact.
Tax lien investors not only worked to defend existing laws. In some
states, they helped to write the very laws they would later profit from. In
1951 attorneys and lobbyists for professional tax buyers helped draft a bill
to overhaul Illinois’s tax delinquency sales law. The 1951 Illinois Revenue
Act removed many of the legal hurdles tax buyers had to complete before
being granted a tax deed and, along with it, vastly narrowed the range of
legal options a tax delinquent property owner could employ in preventing
loss of title. 80 It also empowered the courts to issue tax titles instead of
county clerks, as had previously been the case, which made these deeds
incontestable in court and, for the buyers, immediately merchantable. 81
The tax delinquency sales reforms unleashed a wave of predatory tax
buying, often targeted at low-income, disproportionately minority
homeowners, across the state. In Hopkins Park, a historically African
American town in Kankakee County, white real estate speculators colluded
with county tax officials to force homeowners into tax delinquency and
take their property. 82 In 1959 the county sold over $50,000 in tax
certificates, a sharp increase over previous years. 83 Many of these tax
delinquent homeowners reported to have not received their property tax
bills or been notified that a lien on their home had been sold. 84 As interest
and fees on the original debt accumulated, low-income homeowners
struggled to redeem their properties. Across the town, homeowners lost the
deeds to their homes, which they were subsequently compelled to rent back
from a tax buying syndicate. Residents charged that the county had
conspired with “a group of ten white men . . . who get rich by grabbing
land from Negro property owners.” 85
78. Senate Sends to Graham Bill to Protect Homeowners, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 1, 1979;*
see also Tax Deed Issue Surfaces Again, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Apr. 17, 1981.*
79. Changes May Weaken Remodeled Tax-Deed Law, LAKELAND LEDGER, Apr. 17, 1981.*
80. See George E. Harbert, Tax Foreclosures and Tax Titles, 1952 U. ILL. L.F. 209, 209–25
(1952) (discussing changes to Illinois’ tax delinquency sales resulting from the 1951 Revenue Act); see
also Kahrl, supra note 5, at 3.
81. See Paul O’Connor, A Plague on All Your Houses, CHICAGOAN, Sept. 1974, at 47–49, 78–
81.*
82. Charge ‘Land Grab’ in Hopkins Park; Negroes Lose, CHI. DEFENDER, Sept. 9, 1961, at 1.*
83. Id.*
84. Id.*
85. Id.*

2017]

TAX DELINQUENCY SALES AS DIGNITY TAKING

921

In Chicago, attorney Allan Blair, who had helped to draft the 1951
bill, made a fortune through acquiring title to tax delinquent properties.
Beginning in the early 1960s, Blair signed an agreement with the Interstate
Bond Company, one of the largest tax lien investment firms in the nation
and the first to extend its operations across multiple states, to buy from the
firm all of its unredeemed tax certificates near the close of the two-year
redemption period following a tax sale. 86 The arrangement was mutually
beneficial. Whereas tax buyers like Interstate Bond Company were solely
interested in profiting from interest and fees, and used the threat of property
merely as a means of compelling payments, tax buyers like Blair wanted
the properties, and ruthlessly exploited various provisions of the law to
ensure that tax certificates ultimately became tax deeds. Under the Illinois
law, tax certificate holders could pay subsequent tax bills on the property
without the owner’s knowledge, and apply those charges plus interest to the
final bill. 87 Blair paid these additional taxes, but did not, as a matter of
course, inform the property owner afterward. In many instances, tax
delinquent homeowners did not discover these additional charges until the
final date of redemption, when they attempted to pay their bill, only to
learn that it had increased (sometimes by as much as four times the amount
listed on the notice sent to property owners following a tax sale). 88 Unable
to secure the additional funds, the tax delinquent property owner watched
helplessly as Blair obtained the deed to their home. 89 Such was the case
with William Parks, an elderly African American living on Chicago’s
South Side, who lost his house valued at $15,000 to Blair in 1968 after
arriving at the treasurer’s office on the final date of redemption with
insufficient funds. 90 Blair offered to sell the house back to Parks for
$13,000. Parks was forced to suffer the indignity of having to repurchase
his own house. 91
By the very nature of their enterprise, Blair and his business partner,
David R. Gray, preyed on Cook County’s most vulnerable homeowners.
86. On Blair and Interstate Bond Company’s business arrangement, see generally William
Clements & Terry Shaffer, Tax-Sale Evictee Gets Reprive, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 25, 1969*; see also
Frank Maier, Revival of Bill to Curb Tax-Sale Abuses Sought, CHI. DAILY NEWS, June 20, 1969*; Alvin
Nagelberg, Buyers Zero in on Tax-Delinquent Sites, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1973, at A1.
87. Clements & Shaffer, supra note 86.
88. Id.*
89. Blair, one investigation found, acquired many deeds “by this method.” See ILL. LEGISLATIVE
INVESTIGATING COMM’N, DELINQUENT TAX SALES: A REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(1976).
90. Paul O’Connor, First and Second Drafts of Article on Allan Blair (1974) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Chicago Historical Society Research Center, Paul O’Connor Papers, Box
4).*
91. Id.*
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While property owners fell delinquent on their taxes for a variety of
reasons—personal, financial, sometimes intentional—persons who failed to
redeem within two years were often in dire financial straits, simply did not
understand the law and the penalties for noncompliance, or were incapable
of handling their own financial affairs. Persons like Catherine Catoor, a
widow suffering from dementia who lost her house in Lake Forest, Illinois,
valued at over $85,000, to Blair in 1969. 92 Or Robert Rosborough, a
mentally unstable man who lost his South Side house to Blair that same
year and was subsequently arrested for sending threatening letters to the
Cook County Sheriff’s Office. 93 Friends later said that the loss of his home
drove him over the edge. 94 Or Veronica Micetich, an eighty-three-year-old
immigrant from Yugoslavia who spoke little English, had depended on her
husband to handle tax and financial matters, and fell delinquent on her
property taxes following his death. 95 (Tax delinquency following the death
of a spouse was a common occurrence. 96) In June 1968, Blair moved to
evict her from her home. “The old lady was out in the back yard
screaming,” a neighbor described. “She was screaming, ‘Save my house,
save my house.’” 97
For tax buyers like Blair, these were relatively easy evictions. As
often, tax buyers faced the prospect of violence from desperate
homeowners with little left to lose. In July 1963, sixty-one-year-old Claire
Hammond of Ferndale, Michigan (a suburb of Detroit) shot and killed the
son of one of the city’s largest tax buyers on her front porch after he
offered her the choice of renting her own home or facing eviction.98 The
court found Hammond unfit to stand trial and committed her to a state
mental institution. 99 Blair, for his part, carried a handgun when inspecting
tax delinquent properties. On at least one occasion, he brandished the
92. Memorandum from Marshall Patner on Blair v. Patner Complaint (1973) (on file with the
University of Illinois at Chicago, Special Collections)*; Marshall Patner, Factual Allegations and
Refutations (1973) (on file with the University of Illinois at Chicago, Special Collections, Folder 5, Box
1).
93. Memorandum from Marshall Patner to Chi. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Inquiry, Re: Letter of Allan
L. Blair, File No. X929-70 (Mar. 2, 1971) (on file with the University of Illinois at Chicago, Special
Collections, Folder 5, Box 1).
94. Jack Schnedler & Terry Shaffer, Housing ‘Tax Buys’ by Blair Hit, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr.
24, 1969, at 1.
95. Hugh Hough, How an Aged Widow Was Evicted for Back Taxes, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 24,
1969, at 1, 62.*
96. ILL. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMM’N, supra note 89, at 27.
97. Id.
98. Peter Benjaminson, How to Lose Your Home for $18: The Law and the Tax Buyers, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, May 16, 1971, at 1.
99. Id.
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weapon during a dispute. “He said he would kill . . . one of us niggers,” the
nephew of Lillian Ware, an elderly African American woman whose home
Blair and Gray attempted to acquire in 1973, testified in court. 100
To homeowners facing eviction, predatory tax buying was a cruel,
vicious, indeed unconscionable, act. But to Blair and other tax buyers, it
was just a business, albeit one that presented its own workplace hazards.
Blair rated the tax certificates he purchased from Interstate Bond Company
according to the value of the underlying property. In a deposition, he
testified that he personally inspected the properties and “decided which
items we were taking early, and which items we were taking after the
redemption period—the ones we were hoping would be redeemed, the
junk.” 101 If a home had significant market value, Blair quickly moved to
evict the former homeowners. If it was located in a depressed market, and
its owner was elderly, Blair often agreed to rent the house back to its
occupant, then sell it upon their death. In most cases, the former owner’s
descendants were left unaware of these arrangements, only to later discover
that what they thought was part of their inheritance had in fact been lost to
a tax buyer. 102 When Blair obtained title to Emily Sisko’s house in the
South Side neighborhood of Bridgeport in 1969, he offered to allow her to
live in the house rent-free for the remainder of her life if she agreed to pay
current taxes and insurance. When she refused, Blair quickly moved to
have her evicted and her belongings dumped in a pile by the curb. 103
In predominantly African American neighborhoods, where
prospective homeowners struggled to obtain financing, Blair sold homes he
had acquired via tax deeds on contract. 104 This, in turn, allowed Blair to
defraud another class of victims, extracting a substantial down payment
from a buyer and then moving to have them evicted, and pocketing the
contract buyer’s investment. This is what happened to Rufus Thomas, who

100. Dolores McCahill, Blair Brandished a Gun, Hearing is Told, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 18, 1974,
at 34.
101. Clements & Shaffer, supra note 86.
102. Mike Royko, Chicago: City with ‘I Will,’ CHI. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 4, 1969, at 3.
103. Daniel Egler, 74, Confused, Out on Street, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1974, at 2.
104. The subject of historian Beryl Satter’s book Family Properties, contract sellers exploited
African Americans’ effective exclusion from federal home financing programs and inability to obtain
home mortgage loans in the decades following World War II, buying up properties in black
neighborhoods and then selling them to desperate homebuyers on highly usurious and deceptive terms.
Though contract sales held out the prospect of eventual ownership, few contract buyers ever obtained
title to their homes and most instead lost their entire investment. The practice reaped rich rewards for
white attorneys and investors, and destroyed the lives of countless numbers of victims. See generally
BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN
AMERICA (2009).
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purchased a house from Blair on contract in 1965. 105 Shortly thereafter,
Thomas received several citations for building code violations, which, as
stipulated in the contract, he was required to correct. 106 (Contract sellers
often sold homes that were in violation of numerous building codes, which
the buyer was legally obligated to repair. This, as the historian Beryl Satter
notes, often led contract buyers to miss payments and allowed sellers to
repossess their homes. 107) An unskilled laborer, Thomas drained his
savings in an attempt to complete the repairs. When he failed to do so, he
was hauled back into court and fined $2000.108 Prior to the hearing, Blair—
acting as Thomas’s counsel—duped him into signing an affidavit stating
that he was the sole owner of the property, which absolved Blair’s
corporation of any liability. 109 Unable to pay the fine, Thomas was
sentenced to six months in jail. 110 Upon sentencing, Blair served Thomas
with a notice of forfeiture on his contract and moved to repossess the
home. 111 “In my dream, I’m caught in quicksand,” Thomas told a reporter.
“I have my hands raised for help, but no help ever comes.” 112
Attorney and activist Marshall Patner came to the aid of Thomas and
other victims of Blair’s tax buying scheme. Executive director of the legal
watchdog and research organization Business and Professional People for
the Public Interest (BPI), Patner represented Thomas in a civil suit against
Blair, where he alleged that Blair had committed fraud at the time of the
sale when he failed to inform Thomas of the numerous building code
violations and had taken advantage of Thomas’s “ignorance of real estate
matters” in order to reap “unconscionable” profits. 113 Patner succeeded in
having Thomas’s fine vacated. 114 Blair, instead, was ordered to pay a
reduced fine of $1,000. 115 Media coverage of the case, highlighted by a
series of devastating articles by Chicago Daily News columnist Mike

105. William Clements & Terry Shaffer, Blair Home Buyer Faces Jail, Eviction, CHI. DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 28, 1969, at 3–4.*
106. Id.
107. SATTER, supra note 104, at 148–50.
108. Memorandum from Marshall Patner, supra note 92.
109. Memorandum from Marshall Patner, supra note 93.
110. Memorandum from Marshall Patner, supra note 92.
111. Id.*
112. Hugh Hough, Conflict Charge Faces Realty-Tax Buyer, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 28, 1969, at 3,
10.
113. William Clements, Suit Names Blair in Building Fraud, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 29, 1969.
114. Memorandum from Marshall Patner, supra note 93.
115. Memorandum from Marshall Patner, supra note 92.
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Royko on Blair’s business practices 116, forced Blair to resign his position as
chairman of the Chicago Bar Association’s ethics committee. 117
Patner spent the next decade battling Blair in court and fighting to
have the state’s tax delinquency law declared unconstitutional. Shortly after
the Thomas case, Patner represented Louis and Doretta Balthazar, a couple
who had lost their home to one of Blair’s “dummy” corporations, in a
federal lawsuit that sought to challenge the provision in the law that
allowed tax buyers “whose sole contribution is payment of existing tax
liabilities” from acquiring the “surplus value” of tax delinquent
properties. 118 In Balthazar v. Mari Ltd., Patner argued that the state’s tax
delinquency sales law deprived property owners of the right to due process
under the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and resulted in the
taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. 119 The victims in the case had invested over $16,000 in
a three-flat apartment and lost it as a result of a $500 missed tax bill. 120
“There is no parallel in law where people can be deprived of more than
they owe,” Patner remarked. “Instead of only selling the property and
paying the tax debt and penalties—as is the case with a foreclosed
mortgage—they take everything.” 121 The state, Patner argued, cannot sell
tax delinquent properties to a private purchaser “unless there is a provision
for unrestricted public bidding based on the value of the property.” 122 The
U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois rejected Patner’s argument and
ruled that the state’s law, while harsh, passed constitutional muster because
the two-year redemption period provided the owner with sufficient
opportunity to sell the property and recover its surplus value. In its opinion,
the three-judge panel commented: “[O]ppressive statutes must be tempered
by the legislature, not the court.” 123
In the years that followed and until Blair’s untimely death in an
airplane accident in 1979 124, the press reported several more cases of poor,

116. Royko, supra note 102; Mike Royko, Meet a Ghost: Henry Riedl, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 30,
1969, at 3; Mike Royko, Compassion: A Lost Virtue, CHI. DAILY NEWS, July 1, 1969, at 3.
117. Blair Quits Bar Ethics Probe, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 24, 1969, at 62.
118. Clements & Shaffer, supra note 86.
119. Balthazar v. Mari Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 103, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 114 (1969).
120. Clements & Shaffer, supra note 86.
121. O’Connor, supra note 90.*
122. Guerino J. Turano, Equitable Relief, Collateral Attack and the Illinois Tax Deed, 51 CHI.KENT L. REV. 725, 734 (1974).
123. Balthazar, 301 F. Supp. at 106.
124. Chi. Lawyer Killed in Wisconsin Plane Crash, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1979, at 12.
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elderly, and often minority homeowners losing their homes to Blair. 125
Each case inspired a new round of public outcry over the state’s tax
delinquency sales law, eventually leading to a state legislative investigation
into tax sale abuse. 126 But while lawmakers in Illinois rushed to condemn
Blair, they were reluctant to scrap a law that, lobbyists for the tax lien
industry argued, encouraged taxpayer compliance. Defenders of the law
pointed to the fact that, prior to the 1951 reforms, the state suffered from a
30 percent tax delinquency rate, which had since been reduced to one-half
of one percent. 127 The “horror stories” of delinquent taxpayers who lost
their homes to tax buyers, defenders argued, actually worked to ensure
strict compliance. “One of the main things which helps collection now is
total loss of deed,” Maurice Scott of the Taxpayer’s Federation of Illinois
told state lawmakers. 128 The argument that harsh penalties for property tax
delinquency encouraged compliance was, Patner countered, a “myth
perpetuated by the tax purchasers themselves who, of course, are often
awarded a piece of property outright if a delinquent taxpayer fails to
redeem.” 129 The Illinois-Legislative Investigating Commission similarly
found “no relation between the threat of total forfeiture and the rate of tax
collection[.]” 130 But state lawmakers, caught between local governments’
fiscal needs and a burgeoning taxpayer revolt sweeping the nation, were
reluctant to pass reforms that might discourage taxpayer compliance or,
more ominously, participation in local tax delinquency sales, which had
increasingly become a vital source of annual revenue for local
governments. Ultimately, the state legislature chose not to adopt any of the
recommendations of the legislative committee, and the law remained intact.
***
Rather than curb abusive practices, many states have, in recent
decades, enacted reforms aimed at incentivized tax buying. In 1995 the
125. Mike Royko, Blair ‘Disease’ Is Still With Us, CHI. DAILY NEWS, June 6, 1974, at 3;
Complaint Filed against Tax Buyer and His Lawyer, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1974, at 3; Edith Herman,
Blair Problems Increase, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1974, at B7; Edith Herman, Tax Buyer is Censured by
State Unit, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1974, at C15; Edward McManus, Order Tax Buyer’s License Revoked,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1974, at A1; Basil Talbott Jr., Tax Dispute May Cost Man His Home, CHI. SUN
TIMES, May 1, 1976, at 4, 16; Tax-Delinquent Buyers, Firms are Sued, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1978, at 16.
126. Jack Fuller, 2 Urge Reforms in State Tax Collection Laws, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1974, at 5;
ILL. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMM’N, supra note 89, at v–vii.
127. ILL. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMM’N, supra note 89, at 38.
128. Id. at 44.
129. Id. at 29.
130. ILL. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF 1976: A REPORT TO THE
ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 24 (1977).
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state of Georgia enacted reforms to its tax delinquency laws that increased
the penalty on delinquent property taxes from ten to twenty percent at the
time of a tax sale, allowed tax buyers to charge an additional twenty
percent interest after one year and another twenty percent once a tax buyer
initiates legal proceedings to obtain title to the property. Within 13 months
of purchasing a tax lien, buyers in Georgia netted a sixty percent profit on
investment. 131 In 2001 Washington, DC, passed a reform requiring tax
buyers to file foreclosure cases. Previously, tax foreclosures were handled
by the District’s tax office. This cost-cutting measure, in turn, authorized
tax buyers to add an unlimited amount of legal fees and court costs to a
homeowner’s cost of redemption. 132 Two years later, the Maryland state
legislature removed a $400 cap on legal fees and permitted tax buyers to
charge “reasonable fees,” subject to court approval. 133
By increasing caps on interest rates and allowing tax lien holders to
saddle delinquent property owners with legal fees and other charges, such
reforms have vastly increased the profitability of tax lien investing and the
probability of property acquisition. Georgia’s tax delinquency reforms, for
example, encouraged tax lien investors to avoid contacting a property
owner and initiating repayments, since the profitability of their investment
increased dramatically the longer their wait. 134 Thanks to the reforms
enacted by the District of Columbia and Maryland, tax buyers seeking to
acquire properties could, by charging excessive legal fees, virtually ensure
that a financially distressed homeowner would be unable to redeem. 135
Whenever states and localities enact reforms favorable to the tax lien
industry, vulnerable homeowners suffer. For Atlanta’s Charles W. Spiller, a
fifty-nine-year-old disabled diabetic, a $1200 missed property tax payment
quickly became, following the sale of the tax lien in 1999, a $28,000
debt. 136 Unable to repay, Spiller watched as the house he had built himself
on one leg was sold on the courthouse steps in December 1999 to an

131. Richard Whitt, Investors Can Reap 60 Percent Profit on Tax Liens: Predatory ‘A Very Kind
Word’ for State Law, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 1, 2002, at 1D.
132. Michael Sallah et al., Left with Nothing, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/09/08/left-with-nothing [https://perma.cc/W6FVV2FB].
133. Fred Schulte & June Arney, Small Unpaid Bills Put Residents at Risk, BALT. SUN (Mar. 25,
2007),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-03-25/business/bal-taxsale-small-032507_1_fees-fromprivate-debt-ground-rent-unpaid-bills-put-residents [https://perma.cc/N345-T3GW].
134. Whitt, supra note 131.
135. Katherine Driessen, D.C.’s Tax-Sale System Lacks Notice to Homeowners, Attorneys Say,
WASH. POST (May 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dcs-tax-sale-system-lacks-noticeto-homeowners-attorneys-say/2012/05/28/gJQAr4cRxU_story.html [https://perma.cc/66QV-V2ER].
136. Whitt, supra note 131.
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investment company for $46,000. 137 In 1999, sixty-six-year-old Dorothy
Stewart missed a $1500 property tax bill on her Atlanta home. Later that
year, Fulton County auctioned the tax lien to Vesta Holdings, one of the
nation’s largest tax lien investors. When Stewart failed to redeem, Vesta
acquired the tax deed, which it subsequently sold to another investor for
$31,895 plus $1446 in back taxes. 138
In Baltimore, even an unpaid water bill left homeowners vulnerable to
unscrupulous investors. Maryland is one of the few states that allow local
jurisdictions to include charges other than taxes in lien sales. 139 This,
combined with the lifting of caps on legal fees, has resulted in hundreds of
Baltimore homeowners losing their homes over miniscule debts. Between
2004 and 2007, the Baltimore Sun found, at least 400 homes in the city
were lost as a result of debts other than property taxes. Roughly one-half of
those foreclosures, it found, stemmed from unpaid bills of $500 or less. 140
In 2006, nearly one in three of the approximately 8000 liens the city
offered for sale were for non-tax debts, and of those, roughly one in ten
were for $500 or less. 141 In 2010, a tax lien investor gained title to Vicki
Valentine’s West Baltimore home after she had failed to pay a $362 water
bill. In the months after the sale of the lien, the original bill jumped to over
$3600. Unemployed, caring for her elderly parents, and lacking any
savings, Valentine was unable to settle her mounting debt. In February
2010, the Florida-based tax lien investment firm Sunrise Atlantic took
possession of her home. 142
In Washington, DC, reforms to the city’s tax sale foreclosure process
coincided with rising demand for urban real estate. As real estate values
escalated, so too did property assessments. Low-income homeowners in
gentrifying neighborhoods struggled to meet annual property tax bills. As
tax delinquency rates rose, tax buyers invested heavily in tax delinquent
properties in many of the city’s historically African American
neighborhoods. In this marketplace, investors came in search of property,
not to collect interest. From 2001 through 2013, the annual number of tax
sale foreclosures in the District of Columbia skyrocketed. From 2005 to
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Schulte & Arney, supra note 133.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Fred Schulte et al., The Other Foreclosure Menace: Mortgage Paid Off, Woman Loses
Home—Over a Small Water Bill, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 18, 2010),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/05/18/7082/other-foreclosure-menace
[https://perma.cc/245VD997].
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2012 D.C. tax buyers foreclosed on nearly 200 houses. 143 By 2013 alone,
the Post found, tax buyers were poised to foreclosed on over 1200
additional properties, “many” of which were “owned free and clear by
families for generations.” 144 The vast majority of these properties were
located in heavily minority neighborhoods. A 2013 investigation by the
Washington Post found that seventy-two percent of the pending tax
foreclosures in the city were in neighborhoods where less than twenty
percent of the population was white. 145 Between 2005 and 2008, tax buyers
purchased liens on thirty-three properties along a single street in the
historically black neighborhood of Deanwood.146 Tax buyers quickly resold
properties acquired via tax foreclosure for massive profits. The Post
investigation found examples of houses with liens of less than $300 resold
for nearly $130,000. 147 “This is highway robbery,” an outraged homeowner
whose tax bill quadrupled as a result of legal fees commented. 148
Tax buyers did not simply rob homeowners of their assets. They also
robbed victims of their dignity. Take the case of Bennie Coleman. A
decorated Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War and D.C. resident,
Coleman adorned his duplex house with medals and commendations from
his military service, pictures of his deceased wife, and other mementos
from his life. By the early 2000s, the elderly African American had begun
to suffer from dementia, and in 2006 forgot to pay a $134 property tax
bill. 149 The city sold the lien to a company owned by Steve Berman.150
During these years, Berman operated a bid-rigging scheme that allowed
him to dominate the city’s annual tax sales. 151 Upon acquiring the lien to
Coleman’s home, Berman demanded $4999 in legal fees and expenses.152
143. Sallah et al., supra note 132.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Michael Sallah et al., Bidder With a ‘Checkered Past’, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/09/09/bidder-with-a-checkered-past
[https://perma.cc/96Y6-4CRH].
148. Sallah et al., supra note 132.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Between 2005 and 2007, Berman’s various corporate entities won over fifty percent of all
liens sold in the District. One estimate pegged the total value of these liens at over $540 million. Debbie
(Sept.
9,
2013),
Cenziper
et
al.,
Less
Than
1
in
1,000, WASH. POST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/09/09/suspicious-bidding
[https://perma.cc/VB64-Y7FP]. In 2010, Berman pled guilty to one count of felony conspiracy for a
similar bid-rigging scheme he conducted in Maryland. See generally Fred Schulte, Baltimore Lawyer
Admits to Rigging Tax Sales, BALT. SUN (Mar. 4, 2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-0304/news/bs-md-tax-lien-auctions-20110228_1_tax-liens-property-tax-debts-tax-sales
[https://perma.cc/W5VZ-LYA8].
152. Sallah et al., supra note 132.
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A confused Coleman struggled to comprehend his predicament. Berman
wasted no time in initiating tax foreclosure proceedings and evicting
Coleman. U.S. Marshalls arrived at Coleman’s house and ordered him to
vacate the property. Seated in a folding chair across the street, Coleman
watched as movers dumped his belongings on the curb. For months
afterward, Coleman slept on the front porch of his former home. Neighbors
brought over blankets and plates of food. On several occasions, one
neighbor reported seeing Coleman flag down police squad cars, telling
officers he was locked out of his home and asking for their assistance. 153
Coleman was far from the only elderly D.C. homeowner to suffer the
indignity of being evicted from their home over an unpaid tax bill in recent
years. The 2013 Post investigation told of properties acquired by tax buyers
while the owners lay dying in Hospice care 154, in a nursing home 155, or
suffering from Alzheimer’s. 156 The lucrative rewards D.C. tax liens offered
turned neighbors into predators. Such was the case with Theresa Bollech,
whose house in Northwest D.C. fell into tax delinquency when she
unwittingly failed to pay a special assessment tax. Bollech claimed she
never received a notice that a lien on her home had been sold. 157 (This was
not uncommon, as the District’s poor record-keeping practices resulted in
large numbers of property owners not receiving notices as well as
numerous instances of liens being placed on properties by mistake. 158) A
neighbor bought the lien to Bollech’s home and was weeks away from
initiating foreclosure proceedings when Bollech uncovered the plot.
“There’s no way to describe what it feels like to think you’re going to lose
your home,” Bollech said afterward. “How could they do this to us?” 159
One might add: how could a government not only sanction but design and
administer such a scheme?
In recent years, state and local governments have been forced to
address the predatory practices that resulted from tax delinquency sales
laws and procedures. In 2006 Rhode Island Governor Donald L. Carcieri
signed the Madeline Walker Act, named after the eighty-one-year-old
woman who lost her home to a tax buyer after failing to pay a $150 sewer
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Debbie Cenziper et al., She Lost Her Home: Mistakes Put Homes in Peril, WASH. POST (Sept.
10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/09/10/mistakes-put-homes-in-peril
[https://perma.cc/MJT8-6F4X].
156. Sallah et al., supra note 132.
157. Driessen, supra note 135.
158. Cenziper et al., supra note 155.
159. Driessen, supra note 135.
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bill. The Act required state authorities to notify homeowners who have
fallen behind on their taxes before a lien is sold and offer assistance in
setting up a repayment plan. 160 After the Center for Public Integrity
reported on Vicki Valentine, who lost her family’s West Baltimore home
over a $362 unpaid water bill, Baltimore’s city council passed a resolution
calling on state lawmakers to restrict the sale of liens for debts less than
$750. 161 In January 2013, State Senator James Brochin introduced a bill “in
the Maryland General Assembly [that] would have prohibited tax
collections in the City of Baltimore and suburban Baltimore County from
including residential property in tax sales when the lien ‘arises solely from
any unpaid water, sewer and other sanitary systems charges’ and is less
than $750 in total.” 162 In its Fiscal and Policy Note on the bill, the
Department of Legislative Services warned that the bill threatened to
“decrease [revenues] by a significant amount” and increase “expenditures
for debt service . . . by a significant amount.” The bill never made it out of
committee. 163
In Washington, DC, the Washington Post’s September 2013
investigative series on tax sale abuse generated an unprecedented level of
public outrage. The NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund called on Gray and the
D.C. City Council to enact “systemic reforms” to its tax lien sales system,
noting that “people of color, and particularly African Americans, have
suffered the most” because of this “unfair and predatory practice.” 164 A
group of twelve U.S. Senators called on the newly created Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau to investigate tax lien sale abuse. “While we
understand that some state and local governments are struggling in the
current economic climate,” the senators wrote in a letter to the Bureau, “it
is never acceptable to make up such a shortfall on the backs of some of our

160. Kelsey Gee, Tax Liens Trigger More Foreclosures; Weak Economy Cited as Local PropertyTax Increases—Needed to Balance Budgets—Strain Homeowners’ Ability to Pay, WALL ST. J. (July 13,
2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303644004577523020991281452
[https://perma.cc/U3BR-Q8L9].
161. Fred Schulte, Follow-Up: Baltimore Lawmakers Seek Overhaul of Tax Lien Sale, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (July 7, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/07/07/7092/follow-baltimorelawmakers-seek-overhaul-tax-lien-sale [https://perma.cc/5FH5-G8C5].
162. Fred Schulte, Maryland Bill Would Protect Homeowners from Investors Buying Debt, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/01/18/12051/impactmaryland-bill-would-protect-homeowners-investors-buying-debt [https://perma.cc/7UJ5-SRKL].
163. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 145, 2013 Sess. (Md. 2013).
164. Press Release, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, LDF Urges D.C. Mayor and Council to Change
D.C.’s Property Tax Lien Sales System (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldfurges-dc-mayor-and-council-change-dc’s-property-tax-lien-sales-system
[https://perma.cc/6YDWHDR3].
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most vulnerable citizens.” 165 In the wake of the Post’s investigation, city
officials cancelled all liens sold at that summer’s tax sale 166 and Mayor
Vincent Gray hastily proposed a series of reforms. These included a $2200
cap on legal fees, a ban on sales of liens of less than $2500 on primary
residences, and the appointment of a new property tax ombudsman. 167 The
D.C. Council held an emergency session and unanimously passed
legislation ordering the review of all tax foreclosures resulting from liens of
less than $2500. 168 Later that month, attorneys representing Bennie
Coleman filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court seeking compensation
for Coleman and other victims who had lost their homes to tax buyers and
challenging the constitutionality of tax lien sales. 169
As a chilling example of tax buyers’ greed and cruel indifference to
their victims, Coleman’s case brings the most unsavory aspects of the tax
lien industry and unconscionable outcomes of tax sale laws into focus. The
image of a confused elderly man sleeping on the porch of a home he once
owned but had unwittingly lost to a tax buyer demonstrates how this statesanctioned form of predatory investing can rob society’s most vulnerable
citizens of their dignity in the course of expropriating their property. Tax
sale reformers have sought to use extreme examples of predatory tax
buying to shock the public’s conscience, sway the courts, and spark
legislative reform.
It has been an uphill battle. Defenders of tax sales laws have
consistently argued that cases such as Coleman’s (like the many others that
came before it) are the rare exception, that existing laws afford
homeowners sufficient protections from property loss, and that tax sales
play a vital role in ensuring taxpayer compliance and generating
165. Debbie Cenziper & Michael Sallah, Citing Abuses, Federal Lawmakers Call for Examination
POST
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19,
2013),
of
Tax-Lien
Programs
Nationwide,
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/citing-abuses-federal-lawmakers-call-for-examinationof-tax-lien-programs-nationwide/2013/09/19/c4f74b76-212b-11e3-b73c-aab60bf735d0_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5RLY-67Z4].
166. Michael Sallah et al., D.C. Council Orders Review of Cases where People Lost Homes over
Small Tax Debts, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-councilorders-review-of-cases-where-people-lost-homes-over-small-tax-debts/2013/09/17/2719a5fc-1fd211e3-b7d1-7153ad47b549_story.html [https://perma.cc/WH4B-2SEQ].
167. Mike DeBonis et al., Mayor Vincent Gray Proposes Broad Reforms to D.C. Tax Lien Sales,
WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/2013/09/13/a09336881cc0-11e3-8685-5021e0c41964_story.html [https://perma.cc/9Y3B-KNNJ].
168. Sallah et al., supra note 166.
169. Michael Sallah et al., Lawsuit Challenges the District’s Tax-Lien Program, Seeks
Compensation
for
Families,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
24,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/lawsuit-challenges-the-districts-tax-lien-program-seekscompensation-for-families/2013/09/24/5aab87b4-252c-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html
[https://perma.cc/2E5Y-Y8G6].
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government revenue. Lobbyists for the tax lien industry stress the revenue
tax sales generate (which, they argue, is dependent on laws that incentivize
tax lien investing), and raise the specter of widespread tax delinquency
should lawmakers eliminate sales of tax liens to private investors, cut
interest rates, or relax other penalties. The National Tax Lien Association,
the industry’s leading professional organization, closely monitors and
quickly launches intensive counterattacks against negative reports and
investigations of tax buying. In lobbying elected officials, the NTLA
stresses the community benefits of tax buying. 170 Perhaps most importantly,
it has worked hard to forge close ties with local governments. At the 2016
annual meeting of the National Tax Lien Association, held in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, public officials representing eight county and
municipal governments spoke at the two-day conference, including one
mayor, one city councilman, and two revenue commissioners. 171
While instances of homeowners losing their homes over a paltry tax
bill are the exception, they are not as rare as the tax lien industry claims.
And while most professional tax buyers profess no desire to kick people
out of their homes, they rely on that very threat to profit on their
investments. Tax liens derive their value from the threat of foreclosure and
the fear it instills in desperate homeowners. Even when tax delinquent
homeowners are able to redeem their property, they often emerge from the
experience traumatized. Throughout the redemption process, owners are
forced to navigate a deliberately opaque bureaucratic maze where they are
subject to intimidation and shaming from private investors and public
officials alike. Confused, scared, and ashamed, they are less likely to
challenge the tax buyers’ authority or question the metastasizing fees and
charges they demand. While harsh penalties for tax delinquency are
justified as an effective enforcement mechanism, the vast majority of
owner-occupied properties that fall into delinquency are the result of a
mistake or oversight by the taxpayer or due to severe financial distress, not
because an owner actively seeks to avoid payment yet retain the property.
It is unconscionable, but perhaps not surprising, that many states allow
private investors to take someone else’s property and all of its equity over a
debt that often originates from an accident or oversight. By situating
private investors as a key source of revenue and helping to create a forprofit industry out of one of the most basic duties of government (tax
170. Community
Benefits,
NAT’L
TAX
LIEN
ASS’N,
https://ntlainfo.siteym.com/?page=CommunityBenefits [https://perma.cc/XS5L-3JNL].
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enforcement and collection), tax lien sales embody core features of
neoliberal governance in modern America, while serving as a stark
reminder of the entwined nature of property and dignity dispossession.
Indeed, the forms of infantilization described in this essay are not unique to
tax buying, but rather a core feature of predatory financial practices, in
general. These industries all utilize deliberately complex, mystifying, but
legally binding contracts to not only entrap victims, but to defend their
practices before judges and the public. When challenged by lawmakers,
subjected to unflattering media attention, or threatened with a class-action
lawsuit, practitioners or spokespersons for predatory industries invariably
point out that the victims had signed a contract, and as such should have
done their due diligence before agreeing to its terms. But the terms of these
contracts, like the laws regarding tax delinquency, are designed to reduce
the victim to the position of a child, incapable of fully comprehending the
finer details and dependent on the lender or lien holder for explanation and
guidance. As the victim becomes increasingly aware of the asymmetry of
knowledge and information between themselves and the other party, they
become less likely to exercise their autonomy or seek outside assistance.
Negotiations instead become supplications, as the debt collector or lien
holder assumes the position of the adult admonishing a child for their
carelessness, with the courts and the general public often nodding in
agreement. Tax lien investing differs in one important respect in that local
governments play a central role in operating these enterprises. In recent
decades, many of the most flagrant abuses of tax delinquency laws have
been the result of government deregulation and privatization, as thus fit the
characteristics of many “neoliberal” governances. But as the long history of
tax lien investing also suggests, some of the reforms associated with
neoliberalism might not be that “neo” at all. Indeed, local governments
have long had a material interest in facilitating tax lien investing and, as a
result, have condoned predatory behavior.
Tax delinquent properties, as the cases cited in this article underscore,
are more than just real estate. They are the place where families formed,
where parents raised children, where memories assumed a tangible form.
For an unwitting delinquent taxpayer, the emotional value of a home far
exceeds its value on the open market. For the tax lien investor, the
intangible value of a home to its owners can serve as a powerful tool for
enforcing compliance and extracting profit. For the homeowner, it can be a
traumatic experience, regardless of the ultimate outcome. Indeed, as the
cases cited in this essay show, victims of tax lien investors must sacrifice
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their dignity in order to achieve a favorable result in court, by presenting
themselves as ignorant, infantile, pitiful, and deserving of sympathy.
This last point underscores the problem with models of reparations
that do not also include dignity restoration. By focusing on the outcome
rather than the process that resulted in the loss of property, reparations
models tend to not only underestimate the value of the property to its
victim, but also discount the total cost resulting from the experience of
dispossession. The cases described in this essay also suggest that public
repudiation and ostracism of the perpetrators should form a part of the
process of dignity restoration. In order for victims of predatory tax buyers
to feel fully restored, government and the courts need to clearly and
unequivocally reject and take measures to undermine the culture of
economic predation that allowed such practices to flourish and made its
victims feel shame and embarrassment rather than outrage.

